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Abstract
This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of scal policy in a world
comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational
conict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose scal
policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces scal discipline,
i.e., low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov-perfect
equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt
distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some
salient features of scal policy in modern economies.
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There are large di¤erences in scal policies and government debt across countries and over
time. In spite of this, there is still a limited theoretical understanding of the politico-economic
determinants of debt dynamics. Debt breaks the link between taxation and expenditure,
allowing governments to shift the scal burden to future generations. In a non-Ricardian
world, this raises an intergenerational conict. Since only current generations vote, there is a
politico-economic force for debt accumulation. What, then, prevents the current generations
from passing the entire bill for current spending to future generations?
To address this question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of small open
economies where voters each period choose domestic public good provision and its nancing
through debt and taxes. Debt and capital are traded on worldwide markets. We abstract from
sovereign debt issues by assuming that governments are committed to debt repayment. Within
each country, old agents support high spending on public goods, high labor taxes, and large
debt. The young dislike debt, since it crowds out public good provision within their lifetime.
We characterize the equilibrium in a world where countries care to a di¤erent extent for
public goods relative to private consumption. Such heterogeneity can reect either preferences
or di¤erences in the quality of public good provision. A strong preference for public goods
strengthens the scal discipline and keeps the government debt low. This can explain why
economies with large governments such as the Scandinavian countries run tighter scal policies
than countries such as Greece and Italy which have large debt and, arguably, provide public
goods less e¢ ciently. The theory predicts a stark divergence when governments can use lump-
sum taxes: All countries, except those which are most concerned with public goods, accumulate
large debts and fall into immiseration in the long run, in the sense that they provide no public
goods and use all tax revenue to service their foreign debt. Such a dichotomy is averted when
taxation is distortionary. Then, the level of debt still depends on the countrys preference for
public goods, but the country need not fall into public poverty. A calibrated version of the
model delivers an empirically plausible cross-country distribution of debt and scal policy.
The theory is also consistent with a number of empirical observations. First, the response
of debt to scal shocks is persistent, but mean reverting, in both the theory and the data.
Second, the steady-state debt-GDP ratio is positively correlated across countries with (inverse)
measures of government e¢ ciency proxying for the quality of public good provision. Finally, the
theory predicts a response to a demographic transition consisting of a baby boomfollowed
by a baby bust,which resembles the post-war pattern for debt in many OECD countries.
We contrast the results with an environment in which scal policy is delegated to a Ramsey
planner who attaches independent decaying weight to all future generations, as in Farhi and
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Werning (2007). We emphasize cases in which the planner would plunge the economy into
public poverty, while a sequence of selsh short-lived agents would not do so. The outcome
hinges on the lack of commitment in the political process. If an elected government could
commit scal policy over two periods, no disciplined scal policy could be sustained. Thus,
the lack of commitment may benet future generations more than would a paternalistic planner.
Our paper contributes to the politico-economic literature of government debt. Existing
papers have analyzed the determinants of debt policy in closed economies. These include
Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990),
and, more recently, Battaglini and Coate (2008), Azzimonti Renzo (2009) and Yared (2010).1
Our paper is also related to the recent literature studying the intergenerational conict on taxes
and transfers abstracting from explicit debt (Bassetto 2008, Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt 2008).
These papers impose a government balanced-budget constraint, whereas our focus is on debt
dynamics and on the forces that might induce public poverty. Methodologically, our paper is
related to Klein et al. (2008), who also characterize the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) of
a dynamic game in terms of a generalized Euler equation (GEE) for government expenditures.
However, they focus on a balanced budget and have no intergenerational conict. None of
the existing papers characterize the general equilibrium of a world comprising integrated small
open economies with independent political processes.
1 Environment and Political Equilibrium
The model economy consists of a set of small open economies of a total unit measure populated
by overlapping generations of two-period lived agents who work in the rst period and live o¤
savings in the second period. The total population is constant. Agents consume two goods: a
private good (c) and a domestic public good (g) provided by each economys government.
We assume additively separable logarithmic preferences over private and public goods.2
The utility of a young agent in country j 2 [0; 1]; born in period t, can be written as UY;j;t =
log (cY;j;t) + j log (gj;t) +  (log (cO;j;t+1) + j log (gj;t+1)), where  is the discount factor,
and j and j capture the preference weight on public goods for young and old, respectively.
Cross-country di¤erences in s may reect cultural diversity or di¤erences in the e¢ ciency and
quality of public good provision, related to the technology and organization of the government
sector. We let j be drawn from a nite-valued set, j 2 f; 1; 2; ::; M ; g  , and denote
by  > 0 the measure of countries with j = . Hereafter, we omit t indexes and use recursive
1Battaglini and Coate (2008) analyze a model where legislators can extract pork barrel transfers. They focus
on a di¤erent political mechanism (legislative bargaining) and abstract from intergenerational conict.
2Log utility is for tractability. In Appendix B, available online, we generalize the analysis to CRRA utility.
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notation with x0 denoting next-period x.
The private good is produced with capital and labor as inputs in the production func-
tion Yj = QKj H
1 
j . Capital is perfectly mobile and depreciates fully after one period.
We denote by R the (endogenous) world interest rate and by wj the workerspre-tax wage.
In a competitive equilibrium, Kj = K (R;Hj) = (Q=R)
1=(1 )Hj ; and wj = w (R) =
(1  )Q1=(1 ) (=R)=(1 ). Since the focus of our analysis will be on stationary equilibria,
we characterize the allocations of individual countries as functions of a constant R.
Domestic scal policy is determined through repeated elections. Government debt is traded
at worldwide asset markets. Given an inherited debt b, the elected government chooses the
labor tax rate (  1), public good expenditure (g  0), and the debt accumulation (b0),
subject to a dynamic budget constraint:3
b0j = gj +Rbj    j w (R) H ( j) ; (1)
where aggregate labor supply H () captures that  may distort labor supply. Governments
are committed to not repudiating the debt. Then, sovereign debt cannot exceed the present
value of the maximum feasible tax revenue (the natural debt limit). In an environment with
a constant interest rate, the constraint is bj   w (R) H () = (R  1)  b (R), where  
arg max  H () denotes the top of the La¤er curve.
Logarithmic utility implies that cY = CY ( ;R)  (1 + ) 1A ( ;R) and
cO = (1 + )
 1 RA ( ;R) ; where A ( ;R) is the present value of after-tax lifetime income.
Thus, ignoring irrelevant constants, and denoting by  1 the tax rate in the previous period,
we can express the indirect utility of young and old voters, respectively, as
UY
 
 j ; gj ; g
0
j ; j ; R

= (1 + ) log (A ( j ;R)) + j log (gj) + j log
 
g0j

; (2)
UO (gj ; j ; R) = log (A ( 1;j ;R)) + j log (gj) : (3)
We model the political mechanism as a probabilistic voting model à la Persson and Tabellini
(2000, pp. 54-58). An explicit microfoundation is provided in Appendix B. In this model, the
equilibrium scal policy maximizes a weighted sum of young and old voters utilities. The
weights capture the relative political clout of each group, reecting on the one hand its relative
size and on the other hand exogenous group-specic characteristics, such as the voting turnout
or the relative salience of the scal policy for that group relative to other issues. Formally,
3We abstract from capital income taxation. Note that capital mobility would curtail the governments ability
to tax assets. For instance, if capital tax were source-based and assets could move after the tax announcement,
the tax rate in the political equilibrium outlined below would be zero. Details are available upon request.
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the political objective function is given by U

 j ; gj ; g
0
j ; j ; R

= (1  !)UY

 j ; gj ; g
0
j ; j ; R

+
!UO (gj ; j ; R), where ! is the relative weight on old agents.4
Political Equilibrium. The world equilibrium is a set of (country-specic) policy functions
and laws of motion for government debt, private wealth, and the world capital stock. In
each country, scal policy is determined by the dynamic games between successive generations
of voters. The world interest rate is pinned down by an international asset market clearing
condition. We restrict attention to Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) where voters condition
their strategies only on payo¤-relevant state variables. Since private wealth does not a¤ect the
political preference of old voters, bj is the only domestic payo¤-relevant state variable. The
policy of an individual country does not a¤ect the interest rate, so voters take the equilibrium
interest rate sequence as given.
In general, the distributions of debt and wealth across countries would be state variables,
of which the policy rules and the world interest rate are functions. Following the literature
initiated by Aiyagari (1994), we focus on stationary equilibria featuring a constant interest
rate.5 Consistent with this approach, when we consider scal policy transitions for individual
countries, we maintain that a unit measure of them is in a steady state. In a companion
paper (Song et al. 2011), we provide a denition of MPE in non-stationary environments and
characterize non-stationary equilibria in the case of inelastic labor supply.
Denition 1 A stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium (SMPPE) is an interest rate R,
a stationary debt distribution fbjgj2[0;1] ; and a 3-tuple hB;G; T i, where B :

b;b
R+ !
b;b

is a debt rule, b0 = B (b; ;R) ; G :

b;b
 R+ ! [0; g] is a government expenditure
rule, g = G (b; ;R), and T :

b;b
 R+ ! [0; 1] is a tax rule,  = T (b; ;R), such that:6
1. hB (b; ;R) ; G (b; ;R) ; T (b; ;R)i = arg maxfb02[b;b];g0;1g U ( ; g; g0; ;R) ; subject to
(1), where g0 = G (b0; ;R), and the governments budget constraint is satised:
B (b; ;R) = G (b; ;R) +Rb  T (b; ;R) w (R) H (T (b; ;R)) : (4)
2. The world asset market clears:Z
j2[0;1]

1 + 
A (T (bj ; j ; R) ;R) =
Z
j2[0;1]
b0j +
Z
j2[0;1]
K 0j ; (5)
4Several papers use probabilistic voting models in dynamic games. Hassler et al. (2005) and Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2008) focus, as we do, on Markov-perfect equilibria. Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) and Farhi et al.
(forthcoming) analyze environments with public insurance/taxation and private information.
5Aiyagari (1994) analyzes individual consumption-saving decisions in an economy with a stationary distrib-
ution of households and a constant (endogenous) interest rate. Here, we model a continuum of countries issuing
debt in an integrated world market, where aggregation generally fails.
6For standard technical reasons, we impose a lower bound on debt, b. Such lower bound must be chosen
su¢ ciently low so as not to be binding in equilibrium.
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where b0j = B (bj ; j ; R) and K
0
j = K

R;H

T

b0j ; j ; R

:
3. The debt distribution is stationary and consistent with the policy rule, i.e., a unit measure
of economics keeps debt constant: bj = B (bj ; j ; R) for almost all j 2 [0; 1].
We impose a natural stability condition, requiring that, given R; a perturbation of the
steady-state debt level of an individual country does not trigger diverging debt dynamics.
For instance, if an exogenous shock increases a countrys debt, debt tends to revert to its
steady-state level, or at least does not move further away.
Denition 2 A SMPPE is said to be "stable" (SSMPPE) if, for all j 2 ; the xed point
of the di¤erence equation bj;t+1 = B (bj;t; j ; R) is Ljapunov-stable, where R is the equilibrium
interest rate.
Inelastic Labor Supply. In this section, we provide an analytical characterization of equi-
librium under the assumption that agents labor supply is inelastic. In particular, we set
H () = 1 and A ( ;R) = (1  ) w (R), implying that  = 1: Given R, each countrys MPE
(part 1 of Denition 1) is characterized by a system of two functional equations:
(1  !) (1 + )
w (R) (1   j) = (1 + ! (  1))

gj
; (6)
g0j
gj
=   (1  !)
1 + ! (  1)
@G

b0j ; j ; R

@b0j| {z }
Disciplining e¤ect
; (7)
where gj = G (bj ; j ; R) ; g0j = G

b0j ; j ; R

;  j = T (bj ; j ; R), and b0j = gj + Rbj    j 
B (bj ; j ; R) : Equation (6) yields the trade-o¤ between the marginal cost of taxation, due to
the reduction in private consumption su¤ered by the young, and the marginal benet of public
good provision. Such a trade-o¤ reveals a conict of interest between young and old voters.
The old want higher taxes and current spending on public goods. Thus, the more power
held by the old (i.e., higher !) the greater the reduction in c=g. The preference for public
good provision a¤ects this trade-o¤: a higher  or a higher  reduces c=g. Equation (7) is a
generalized Euler equation (GEE) for public good consumption. Its right-hand side (and in
particular the derivative @G=@b0) captures the disciplining e¤ect exercised by the young voters
who anticipate that increasing debt will prompt a scal adjustment reducing their future public
good consumption. Such an e¤ect hinges on the olds taste for public good. If  = 0, then all
voters would choose b0j = b: Thus, the youngs concern for future public good provision is key
to sustaining a tight scal policy, given the lack of intergenerational altruism.
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We guess and verify that the equilibrium policy functions are linear (see the proof of
Proposition 1). Substituting the guesses into (4)-(6)-(7) and solving for the undetermined
coe¢ cients yields:
gj = G (bj ; j ; R) = R (j)
 
b  bj

; b0j = B (bj ; j ; R) = b 
(1  !)R
1 + ! (  1) (j)
 
b  bj

(8)
 j = T (bj ; j ; R) = 1  (1  !) (1 + )
(1 + ! (  1)) j
R
w (R)
 (j)
 
b  bj

;
where  ()  (1 + (1  !) ((1 + ) + ) = ( (1 + ! (  1)))) 1 > 0 and 0 () > 0. Note
that B (b; ;R) is decreasing in ; i.e., a larger weight on public goods reduces debt accumula-
tion. Moreover, @G=@b0 =  R () < 0, so public good provision is falling in b.
Next, we turn to the determination of the world interest rate and the associated debt
distribution (parts 2-3 of Denition 1). To this end, rewrite the law of motion of debt in (8)
as

b  b0j

= (R=R (j))
 
b  bj

, where R ()  (1 + ! (  1)) = ( ()   (1  !)) > 1;
R0 () < 0. Note that (i) there can be no j 2  such that R > R (j). Otherwise, a
positive measure of countries would accumulate an ever-increasing surplus, whereas the rest of
the world can at most run a debt equal to b, thereby preventing world asset-market clearing.7
(ii) It is impossible that R
 


> R. Otherwise, all countries would converge to the debt limit,
and agents would hold no private wealth since their rst-period income is fully taxed away.
Again, the world asset market would not clear. Given (i) and (ii), the SSMPPE must feature
R = R
 


; namely, the market clearing interest rate is determined by the countries with the
strongest preference for the public good. All other countries have R < R (j) and converge
to public poverty. Eq. (5) then pins down the average debt level for countries with  = .8
Proposition 1 A SSMPPE is characterized by the set of policy functions (8) and by the
following steady-state equilibrium conditions:
(i) R = R
 

   (1 !)1+!( 1)   1 > 1
(ii)
R
jjj=
bj =   b
 

   b  
1+
 
b+K (R; 1)

<  b; R jjj= gj =  G  b   ; ;R > 0;R
jjj=
 j =   T
 
b
 


; ;R

< , where R = R
 


:
(iii) bj = b, gj = 0, and  j = 1, for almost all jjj< :
The SSMPPE has stark properties: Even small cross-country di¤erences in s lead to
divergence: in all countries except those with the highest , private and public consumption are
7A SMPPE such that all countries have b = b exists, but violates our stability criterion.
8 In Song et al. (2011), we provide a full characterization of the MPE in a non-stationary environment where
the debt distribution, the capital stock, and the interest rate are time varying. We show that for any initial
distribution of debt and capital, such MPE converges to the stationary equilibrium of Proposition 1.
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crowded out by debt repayment to foreign lenders. The scally disciplined (high-) countries
hold the entire world wealth and are the only ones that can provide public goods.
This proposition is fundamentally di¤erent from the well-known result that in an economy
where agents (or countries) have di¤erent discount factors, the most patient agents end up
owning all assets in the economy. Indeed, our agents have nite lives and do not save beyond
their old age. Rather, the result hinges on the lack of commitment inherent under repeated
voting. Suppose, for instance, that voters at time t could commit to scal policy in period t and
t+1. Then, irrespective of , the young and the old would agree to set bt+2 = b, inducing public
poverty ever after. It is therefore the dynamic game that empowers the future generations and
averts immiseration in the high- economies. We return to this point in Section 4.
Elastic Labor Supply. We introduce elastic labor supply by assuming that young agents
share their time endowment between market (h) and household production (1   h). Mar-
ket earnings are subject to a linear tax rate,  2 [0; 1]. Old agents can only do house-
hold production.9 The household production technology is given by yH = F (h), where
F 0 < 0; F 00  0; F 000  0, and F (1) = 0. Since household production cannot be taxed, taxation
distorts labor allocation. Now, A ( ;R) = maxh2[0;1] f(1  ) w (R) h+ F (h) + F (0) =Rg,
and H () =   (F 0) 1 ((1  ) w (R)) ; where H  0, H  0 and A =  w (R) H () ;
by the envelope theorem. Let e ()    (dH=d) (=H ()) denote the tax elasticity of labor
supply. The properties of F ensure that e  0. Hence, e () = 1; and e () < 1 for all  <  .
The functional equation (6) becomes
(1  !) (1 + )
A ( j ;R)
= (1  e ( j)) (1 + ! (  1)) j
gj
: (9)
Equation (9) encompasses the case of lump-sum taxes, (6), as a particular case, where
A ( ;R) = 1    and e () = 0: The key di¤erence is that, while under lump-sum taxes the
equilibrium c=g ratio was constant, it grows with taxes when labor is elastic (since e > 0).
Intuitively, the convex tax distortion makes it more expensive to nance g when b, and, hence,
interest payments, is larger. This has interesting implications for the GEE, (7). Under inelastic
labor supply, @G=@b0 is constant, hence, the disciplining e¤ect is independent of b. In contrast,
passing on the bill becomes increasingly hard when taxes are distortionary and distortions
are convex.10 As debt accumulates, future taxes raise less and less revenue, inducing future
governments to make more than proportional cuts in g. The young perceive scal adjustments
9The qualitative results are unchanged if one assumes that the agents receive no labor income in the second
period. The second-period income facilitates the quantitative exercise, since in the real world there are transfers
to the old from which we abstract for simplicity, and which a¤ects the personal saving behavior.
10This means that the slope @G=@b0 is not constant along the transition. In steady state, @G=@b0
=   (1 + ! (  1)) = ((1  !)) < 0; i.e., increasing b0 reduces next-period public good provision.
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as increasingly painful and therefore demand more scal discipline as b increases. As we will
see below, this growing scal discipline can halt debt accumulation and sustain a steady state
with an interior debt level even for economies with  < .
A full analytical characterization of the SSMPPE under elastic labor supply is not available;
therefore, we must resort to numerical analysis. We solve the model numerically by two
di¤erent methods. First, we use a standard projection method with Chebyshev collocation to
approximate T and G, exploiting the equilibrium conditions (7) and (9). Second, we use the
algorithm of Krusell et al. (2002) see Appendix B. The results are essentially identical.
2 Quantitative Analysis
This section illustrates the properties of the model with elastic labor supply and shows that a
reasonably calibrated version of the model is consistent with key features of OECD economies.
We then use the calibrated economy to run some quantitative experiments. As above, we
analyze a stationary equilibrium where the world interest rate is constant. The length of
a period is 30 years. We assume a capital share of output of  = 1=3 and an annualized
capital-output ratio of 3. Firmsoptimization then implies an annualized interest rate of 4%,
which is standard in quantitative macro (cf. Trabandt and Uhlig, 2010). We normalize w
to unity and parameterize the household production technology by the production function
F (h) = = (1 + ) X   1  h1+1=, where  > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Since
 = 1= (1 + ), we set  = 2=3 so that the top of the La¤er curve is at  = 60%, in line with
Trabandt and Uhlig (2010). Moreover, we set X to target a ratio of market labor earnings
to total income of the young (including the value of home production) of 33=51, which is
the ratio of market hours worked to total hours for US working-age households (Aguiar and
Hurst, 2007). We set ! = 0:25 to reect the political inuence of the old, measured by voters
turnout.11 The parameters  and  determine scal policy. We let  capture the empirical
debt distribution. To keep the analysis simple, we focus on two types of countries, half of which
have a high  and half of which have a low .12 We set  = 2:2 to match the average OECD
labor taxes in steady state.13 Note that this calibration implies that the old care more for
11 In the real world, there are fewer retirees than workers, but their turnout rate is higher. We try to resolve
this tension in the two-period model by setting ! equal to the share of aggregate votes cast by voters 61 years
and older in the 2004 US election. Below we explore the e¤ect of increasing ! to 0.5.
12To focus on small open economies, we exclude the US, Japan, and Germany and order the remaining OECD
countries according to their debt-GDP ratio. The average during 2002-2008 was 56%, and the 50% countries
with the largest (smallest) debt had an average debt-to-output ratio of 75% (36%). Since one period in the
model corresponds to 30 years, we set  and  to target steady-state debt-output ratios of 75%=30 = 2:5% and
1:2% in the high- and low-debt economies, respectively.
13During 2002-2008, labor taxes accounted for 27.1% of GDP in small OECD countries. This includes all
unambiguous taxes on labor income, plus taxes on goods and services, plus 2/3 of taxes on individual income
8
public goods than the young, which we view as a reasonable feature (e.g., parks, safety, etc.).
Finally, aggregate capital and government debt determine the world wealth, and  is set so
that the world market for savings clears. The average annual debt-output ratio in small OECD
countries is 0.56, which implies a world wealth-output ratio of (3 + 0:56) =30 and, hence, an
annualized  = 0:973. Table 1 summarizes the parameters.
Figure 1 plots the SSMPPE equilibrium policy functions B, G, and T for the case of
inelastic labor supply of Proposition 1 (panels a-b-c) and for calibrated economies (panels
a´ -b´ -c´ ). The two curves in each panel represent high- and low- economies, respectively.
Consider, rst, debt. When labor is inelastic (panel a), B coincides with the 45-degree line
for the  economies, so every b is a steady state. For the low- economies, the slope of B is
smaller than unity, and the dynamics converge to b. In the calibrated equilibrium with elastic
labor supply (panel a´ ), both high- and low- economies have a strictly convex B (b) function,
crossing the 45-degree line twice: at an interior steady-state level and at the natural debt limit.
The intuition for such convexity is that the disciplining e¤ect strengthens as b grows, implying
less than proportional increases in b0 as b gets larger. Second, both high- and low- economies
converge to the interior steady state, as long as b0 < b. Thus, di¤erences in  drive di¤erences
in steady-state debt levels, but there is no immiseration for even small positive levels of .
Panels b-b´ and c-c´ plot the equilibrium functions G and T , respectively, for the case of
inelastic and elastic labor supply. Under inelastic labor supply (panels b and c), G and T are,
respectively, decreasing and increasing linear functions of b, and the c=g ratio remains constant
along the transition. Under elastic labor supply, both T and G are concave in b (panel b´ -c´ ).
The value of j@G=@b0j and, hence, the disciplining e¤ect, is increasing in b, which is the reason
why each economy has a unique and stable interior steady state. For instance, if an economy
starts with b above steady state, the public to private consumption will increase over time as b
falls. The crux is the convex nature of the tax distortion that makes it more costly to nance
g as an economy comes closer to the La¤er curve.
Figure 2 shows that the SSMPPE converges smoothly to the equilibrium with inelastic
labor supply as  ! 0. The gure displays steady-state values of R, b, g, and  , for  2 [0; 1]
holding all other parameters as in Table 1. At  = 0, low- economies are immiserized, whereas
the governments of high- countries run on average a surplus (b =  0:05), and can a¤ord both
a high public good provision (g = 0:30) and low taxes ( = 0:10). For low s, results are
similar, although there is no full immiseration. As  increases, the di¤erence in taxes shrinks
(for  > 0:2 the tax di¤erences are very small). A larger distortion strengthens scal discipline
and prots. With  = 1=3, this amounts to 0:407 of labor income.
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in the low- economies, so the world interest rate falls. Thus, high- economies enjoy about the
same private consumption as do low- economies, but have more public goods and lower debt.
For the benchmark calibration of  = 0:6; the high- economies have an expenditure-to-GDP
ratio 10% larger than that of low- economies (36.1% vs. 32.8%) whereas taxes are about the
same (41.2% vs. 40.2%). Debt is non-monotonic in  in high- economies. This is due to two
opposing forces: On the one hand, a larger  reduces R, making public saving less attractive.
On the other hand, the larger distortion strengthens the drive to cut taxes. At lower levels of
, the former e¤ect prevails, whereas at higher levels of , the latter is stronger.
Some limitations of our quantitative analysis should be acknowledged. First, the model
should ideally feature a ner partition of time to capture more nuanced political shifts over
the life cycle than the coarse old-young partition of a two-period model. Second, as in the
previous literature on dynamic games, we cannot appeal to general existence or uniqueness
results. Nevertheless, several aspects of the numerical solutions are reassuring: when lowering
the Frisch elasticity  toward zero in which case existence can be proven the equilibrium
policy rules and equilibrium R converge smoothly to the analytical equilibrium. Moreover,
two di¤erent numerical methods yield the same solution. Third, to focus on government debt,
we abstracted from some dimensions of scal choices such as transfers, capital income taxes,
and sovereign debt default. Finally, although we make progress on the general equilibrium by
focusing on stationary equilibria, we have abstracted from transitions of the world economy.
Table 1: Calibration
Target observation Parameter
Capital-output ratio (annualized) 3 R (1:04)30
Aggregate world wealth-output ratio (annualized) 3:56  (0:973)30
Capitals share of output 1=3  1=3
Average tax on labor 40:7%  2:22
Tax rate corresponding to the top of the La¤er curve 60%  2=3
Debt-GDP ratio for high-debt countries 75%  0:39
Debt-GDP ratio for low-debt countries 36%  0:37
Ratio of labor income to total income for young 33=51 X 1:225
Relative voter turnout for the old (61+) in the US 25% ! 0:25
3 Empirical Implications
Fiscal shocks . The model features interesting scal policy dynamics. Suppose that the
economy is hit by a one-time scal shock (e.g., a surprise war) requiring an exogenous spending
of Z units. The shock is equivalent to an exogenous increase in debt from b to b+Z=R: Since T is
increasing in b and G is decreasing in b, the government reacts by increasing  and decreasing
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g in wartime. After the war, debt, taxes, and expenditure revert slowly to the original steady
state. These predictions accord well with the empirical evidence of Bohn (1998), who nds the
US debt-to-output ratio to be highly persistent, but mean reverting.
Government e¢ ciency and cross-country debt distribution. In our model, high- and
low- economies can be interpreted as economies whose governments provide public goods more
and less e¢ ciently. One interpretation is that  is a stand-in for the quality of public goods. For
an equal g; high- (low-) governments provide public goods of higher (lower) quality, implying
a larger (smaller) marginal utility (=g) of government expenditure. Another interpretation is
that  measures the elasticity of e¤ective public good provision to government expenditure.14
Thus, the theory predicts that the steady-state debt-GDP ratio is increasing in the e¢ ciency
of public good provision. This prediction is consistent with data for industrialized countries.
We proxy the e¢ ciency of governments by the index of corruption perception provided by
Transparency International (TI, where a high index means low corruption), and measure gov-
ernment debt by the ratio of central government debt to GDP (source: OECD). We calculate
national averages of both measures over the sample period 1990-2008 for the set of twenty-four
countries that were OECD members over the entire period.15 With the exception of Turkey
(which in fact turns out to be a strong outlier), this yields a homogeneous sample of nan-
cially integrated industrialized countries. The cross-country correlation between debt and the
TI corruption index is negative and signicant,  =  0:51 (p value 0.01). The result is not
driven by outliers: Excluding Turkey strengthens the correlation,  =  0:68.16 The correlation
is robust to alternative measures of the e¢ ciency of governments, such as the corruption mea-
sure from the International Country Risk Guide ( =  0:46) and measures of "e¤ectiveness
of governance," "quality of regulation," and "control of corruption" from the World Banks
Worldwide Governance Indicators ( =  0:41,  =  0:44, and  =  0:49, respectively).
The existing measures of corruption have little time variation. Instead, one can use political
shifts within countries to assess the implications for debt dynamics. In an earlier version of
this paper (Song et al. 2007), we assumed shocks to political preferences. Suppose left-leaning
14Suppose ~g = g, where ~g denotes the e¤ective provision and g denotes the expenditure. The utility agents
earn from an expenditure level g would then be  log (g) as postulated in (2).
15When early data are missing, we use the available data. We exclude post-2008 years, since the debt-e¢ ciency
correlation is a steady-state prediction, whereas the post-2008 debt dynamics are a¤ected by the response to a
large shock. Including 2009-10 does not change the results signicantly.
16Most countries that accessed the OECD after 1990 are former socialist economies, some of which were not
separate entities before 1990. Many started from low debt levels and are still in a transition toward steady state.
We exclude them since we compare data with the theorys steady-state predictions.
If we include all current OECD countries, the correlation remains signicant as long as one conditions on
a dummy for countries entering after 1990. The partial correlation coe¢ cient between debt and corruption is
negative and signicant at the 5% level: P =  0:37, and P =  0:49 if Israel, a high-debt outlier, is excluded.
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(right-leaning) governments have stronger preferences for public (private) good consumption.
The theory then predicts that debt should grow more under right-wing governments. In line
with this prediction, we nd that in a panel of OECD countries 1980-2005, a political shift
from left to right increases the debt-GDP ratio by an average of 0.7 percentage points per year.
Demographic changes. The model is sensitive to the political power of the old. Consider
increasing ! to 0:5 in all countries.17 This change has dramatic e¤ects: the lower scal discipline
yields an average (annualized) steady-state debt-GDP ratio of 216%! The annualized interest
rate increases to 5% and taxes increase to 55.5% on average, implying a massive crowd-out
of physical capital and a 33% reduction in world (market) GDP. Most of the tax revenue is
now devoted to servicing the debt, and government expenditures fall by 62% compared to the
benchmark steady state, even though the old care more about g than the young.
Another interesting application is the (partial) equilibrium e¤ect of a demographic transi-
tion. Here, we consider a single small economy in steady state at t = 0. We assume that the
resource cost of public good provision is proportional to the population size. Unexpectedly,
at t = 1 the birth rate rises and reverts to normal in t  2 (i.e., a baby boom followed by a
baby bust). Let Nt denote the size of the cohort born in t. The political weights of the young
and old are now adjusted by age group sizes, being respectively (1  !)Nt and !Nt 1. The
initial increase in Nt=Nt 1 implies larger political weight of the young and, hence, a stronger
scal discipline and low debt. Taxes are low and public good provision is high due to the large
tax base. Then, Nt=Nt 1 falls in t = 2: This has two consequences: the ageing population
increases the political inuence of the old and reduces the tax base. Both e¤ects weaken scal
discipline. Debt grows and converges gradually to steady state. Meanwhile, taxes increase
and public good provision falls. These predictions are consistent with the observation that
since the 1980s an increasing share of old voters has been accompanied by rising government
debt, especially in rapidly ageing societies like Japan. The U-shaped debt behavior in the
baby boom-baby bust example also resembles the post-war pattern for debt in many OECD
countries. A simulated demographic transition is shown in Figure 3 in Appendix B.
4 Social Planner
In this section, we consider the choice of a Ramsey planner of a small country who sets the
domestic scal policy sequence so as to maximize the discounted utility of all generations,
subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions and R, as determined by the SSMPPE. Fol-
17The vote share of people age 61+ is expected to increase to 50% by 2050. Moreover, Mulligan and Sala-i-
Martin (1999) argue that the political clout of the old has increased even beyond demographics. For example,
since 1968 the overall US voting turnout has fallen by 10%, whereas it has increased 3% for those age 65+.
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lowing Farhi and Werning (2007), the planner attaches geometrically decaying Pareto weights
 t   t+1 (with  2 [0; 1)) on the discounted utility of each generation t. The sequential
formulation of the planners problem is
W = max
fgt; t;bt+1g1t=0
(
UO;t +
1X
t=0
 t+1UY;t
)
; (10)
subject to (1), bt  b 8t, and the initial debt b0. Proposition 2 characterizes the allocations.
Proposition 2 Given R; the Ramsey allocation of an individual economy is characterized by
the Euler equation for public good consumption, g0=g =  R, and the following intratemporal
trade-o¤ between private and public goods:
 (1 + )
A ( ;R)
= (1  e ()) (+  ) 
g
: (11)
Suppose  R < 1. Then, the scal policy sequence converges to public poverty: limt!1 bt = b,
limt!1 gt = 0, and limt!1  t =  .
The Ramsey allocation di¤ers starkly from the SSMPPE: the long-run debt is entirely
determined by the planners discount factor  and is independent of her . This feature has
interesting implications. Consider, for example, an SSMPPE with inelastic labor supply and
recall that in that case, the equilibrium interest rate is falling in . Therefore, for any  > 0
and ! < 1, there exists a threshold discount factor  > 0 such that a planner with a discount
factor  2 0;   would start depleting resources, plunging the country into immiseration,
even if it were initially rich and had  = .18 The paternalistic planner has concerns for future
generations, but R might be so low that she chooses to grab resources from them to benet
more recent generations, inducing what we call long-run immiseration. Conversely, in political
equilibrium, selsh voters would like to extract resources from future generations, but the lack
of commitment limit their ability of doing so. In turn, the repeated political representation of
young voters averts immiseration.19
This result extends to the Ramsey allocation where the scal policies of all countries are
determined by a universal planner with discount factor  . To see this, consider the symmetric
case with identical countries and inelastic labor supply. In this case the world interest rate
18Conversely, for  su¢ ciently large, the planner would choose ever-increasing g and c.
Another interesting benchmark is a non-paternalistic planner who only cares about the two generations alive
at t = 0. In this case, public poverty is attained after two periods. This would also be the political equilibrium
outcome if the initial generations of voters could choose scal policy with commitment over two periods.
19This result is related to Sleet and Yeltekin (2008), who show that in a dynamic private information model,
the lack of commitment arising from political constraints can avert immiseration in an environment where this
would arise under commitment. In their paper this is due to an ever-increasing concentration of wealth.
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is R =   1 and there is no immiseration in the long run. However, in the corresponding
SSMPPE, the world interest rate would be R
 


> 1. Hence, there exists a range of low
(high) discount factors  such that R is higher (lower) in the planning allocation than in the
corresponding SSMPPE, implying a lower (higher) world capital stock and wages in steady
state. The possibility that a paternalistic planner may treat future generations worse than
do selsh short-lived agents who set scal policy subject to a sequence of political constraints
runs against the standard intuition that politico-economic forces (political rent-seeking, pork
barrel, etc.) lead to an excessive public debt.20 We have abstracted from such distortions,
here, in order to highlight how the intergenerational conict shapes debt. Assessing the relative
importance of the di¤erent mechanisms is left to future research.
APPENDIX: Proof of Proposition 1
Using equation (1) to eliminate gj , rewrite the problem as
maxfb0j2[b;b]; j2[0;1]gU
 
 j ; b
0
j  Rbj +  j w (R) ; G
 
b0j ; j ; R

; j ; R

= (1  !)  (1 + ) log (1   j) + j log  b0j  Rbj +  j w (R)+ j log  G  b0j ; j ; R
+!
 
log (1   1;j) + j log
 
b0j  Rbj +  j w (R)

:
The FOCs with respect to  j and b0j yield, respectively, (6) and (7). Next, guess that gj = jR
 
b  bj

;
where j is an undetermined coe¢ cient. Then, (6) and (7) yield the expressions for  j = T (bj ; j ; R)
and b0j = B (bj ; j ; R) in (8). Standard algebra shows then that (1), (6), and (7) are veried if and
only if j =  (j)  (1 + (1  !) ((1 + ) + j) =j (1 + ! (  1))) 1 ; establishing (i).
Next, consider the steady-state world market clearing condition. Recall that
CY = (1 + )
 1 (1  T ) w (R) : Stationarity implies that, for a unit measure of countries, b = b0
and K 0 = K (R; 1) : The argument in the text establishes that R = R
 


: Since R < R () for all
 < , then (8) implies that a measure 1   of countries has b = b and  = 1: Hence, (5) simplies to


1 + 
 
1  T  b; ;R w (R) = (1  )b+ Z
jjj=
bj +K (R; 1) ;
where R = R
 


and b = w (R) = (R  1) : Substituting T  b; ;R into this expression and sim-
plifying terms yields
R
jjj=
bj = b    1=
 
1 + 
   b+K (R; 1). Finally, Ljapunov stability
holds for any b in high- economies, since B
 
b; ;R
 


= b: For low- economies, b0 < b for all
b < b; and thus b is asymptotically stable. QED
20The possibility that future generations are better o¤ in a competitive equilibrium than in the allocation
chosen by a paternalistic planner who discounts the utilities of future generations arises also in standard OLG
models. Here, we prove that this result extends to a model with endogenous debt and scal policy.
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Panels a-c plot the equilibrium policy functions B(b), G(b), and T(b), respectively, for 
the inelastic labor economy (Proposition 1, qualitative graphs). The solid red (dotted 
blue) line denotes the low-θ (high-θ) economy. Panels a’-c’ plot the corresponding 
equilibrium policy functions for the calibrated economy with elastic labor supply 
(parameter values are as given in Table 1).  
Figure 2: Continuity of the SMPPE 
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Panel a plots the (annualized) equilibrium interest rate for economies with Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply ξ ranging from 0 to 1. All other parameters are as given in 
Table 1. Panels b, c, and d plot the corresponding steady-state allocations of debt, 
public goods, and taxes. The solid red (dotted blue) line denotes the low-θ (high-θ) 
economies. Stars and diamonds show the 24 values of  for which the SSMPPE is 
computed numerically. The values for correspond to the equilibrium computed 
analytically in Proposition 1. 
Appendix B (not for publication)
In this appendix we present some supplementary material for the paper Rotten Parents and
Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debtby Zheng
Song, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. Section B1 provides the politico-economic
microfoundations of the model. Section B2 provides the derivation of equation (9). Section
B3 provides the proof of Proposition 2. Section B4 extends the analysis under CRRA utility.
Section B5 shows the result of numerical analysis using the alternative method of Krusell et
al. (2002). Finally, Section B6 shows the details of the numerical analysis of a demographic
transition such as the one discussed in the text.
B1. PROBABILISTIC VOTING MODEL
The political equilibrium discussed in the paper has an explicit politico-economic micro-
foundation in terms of a politico-economic voting model, based on Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987). In this appendix, we describe the voting model, which is an application of Persson and
Tabellini (2000) to a dynamic voting setting.
The population has a unit measure and consists of two groups of voters, young and old,
of equal size (we discussed below the extension to groups of di¤erent sizes). The electoral
competition takes place between two o¢ ce-seeking candidates, denoted by A and B. Each
candidate announces a scal policy vector, b0,  , and g, subject to the government budget
constraint, b0 = Rb + g   w (R)  H () ; and to b0  b:21 Since there are new elections every
period, the candidates cannot make credible promises over future policies (i.e., there is lack of
commitment beyond the current period). Voters choose either of the candidates based on their
scal policy announcements and on their relative appeal, where the notion of appeal is explained
below. In particular, a young voter prefers candidate A over B if, given the inherited debt
level b, preference parameter ; the world interest rate, and the equilibrium policy functions
hB;G; T i which apply from tomorrow and onwards,
UY
 
A; gA; G
 
b0A

; b; ; R

> UY
 
B; gB; G
 
b0B

; b; ; R

:
Likewise, a young voter prefers candidate A over B if
UO (gA; b; ; R) > UO (gB; b; ; R) :
21Note that the announcement over the current scal policy raises no credibility issue, due to the assumption
that the politicians are pure o¢ ce seekers and have no independent preferences on scal policy.
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iJ (where J 2 fY;Og) is an individual-specic parameter drawn from a symmetric group-
specic distribution that is assumed to be uniform in the support [ 1=  2J ; 1=  2J]. Intu-
itively, a positive (negative) iJ implies that voter i has a bias in favor of candidate B (candidate
A). Note that the distributions have density J and that neither group is on average biased
towards either candidate. The parameter  is an aggregate shock capturing the ex-post average
success of candidate B whose realization becomes known after the policy platforms have been
announced.  is drawn from a uniform i.i.d. distribution on [ 1= (2 ) ; 1= (2 )].22 The sum
of the terms iJ +  captures the relative appeal of candidate B: it is the inherent bias of
individual i in group J for candidate B irrespective of the policy that the candidates propose.
The assumption of uniform distributions is for simplicity (see Persson and Tabellini (2000), for
a generalization).
Note that voters are rational and forward looking. They take into full account the e¤ects of
todays choice on future private and public-good consumption. Because of repeated elections,
they cannot decide directly over future scal policy. However, they can a¤ect it through their
choice of next-period debt level (b0), which a¤ects future policy choices through the equilibrium
policy functions B, T , and G:
It is at this point useful to identify the swing voterof each group, i.e., the voter who is
ex-post indi¤erent between the two candidates:
Y
 
b0A; A; gA; b
0
B; B; gB; b; ; R

= UY
 
A; gA; G
 
b0A

; b; ; R
  UY  B; gB; G  b0B ; b; ; R  
O (gA; gB; b; ; R) = UO (gA; b; ; R)  UO (gB; b; ; R)  :
Conditional on ; the vote share of candidate A is
A
 
b0A; A; gA; b
0
B; B; gB; b; ; R

= 1  B
 
b0A; A; gA; b
0
B; B; gB; b; ; R

=
1
2
Y

Y
 
b0A; A; gA; b
0
B; B; gB; b; ; R

+
1
2Y

+
1
2
O

O (gA; gB; b; ; R) +
1
2O

=
1
2
+
1
2
 
Y   UY  A; gA; G  b0A ; b; ; R  UY  B; gB; G  b0B ; b; ; R  
+
1
2
 
O  (UO (gA; b; ; R)  UO (gB; b; ; R))  

:
22The realization of  can be viewed as the outcome of the campaign strategies to boost the candidates
popularity. Such an outcome is unknown ex ante.
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Note that A and B are stochastic variables, since  is stochastic. The probability that
candidate A wins is then given by
pA = Prob

A
 
b0A; A; gA; b
0
B; B; gB; b; ; R
  1
2

= Prob
24  < YY +O (UY (A; gA; G (b0A) ; b; ; R)  UY (B; gB; G (b0B) ; b; ; R))
+ 
O
Y +O
(UO (gA; b; ; R)  UO (gB; b; ; R))
35
=
1
2
+  (1  !)  UY  A; gA; G  b0A ; b; ; R  UY  B; gB; G  b0B ; b; ; R
+ ! (UO (gA; b; ; R)  UO (gB; b; ; R)) ;
where !  O=  Y + O.
Since both candidates seek to maximize the probability of winning the election, the Nash
equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
 
b0A; 

A; g

A

= max
b0A;A;gA
(1  !)  UY  A; gA; G  b0A ; b; ; R  UY  B; gB; G  b0B ; b; ; R
+! (UO (gA; b; ; R)  UO (gB; b; ; R)) ; 
b0B; 

B; g

B

= max
b0B ;B ;gB
(1  !)  UY  B; gB; G  b0B ; b; ; R  UY  A; gA; G  b0A ; b; ; R
+! (UO (gB; b; ; R)  UO (gA; b; ; R)) :
Hence, the two candidatesplatform converge in equilibrium to the same scal policy maxi-
mizing the weighted-average utility of the young and old,
 
b0A; 

A; g

A

=
 
b0B; 

B; g

B

= max
b0 ;g
 
(1  !)UY
 
 ; g;G
 
b0

; b; ; R

+ !UO (g; b; ; R)

;
subject to the government budget constraint. This is the political objective function given in
the body of the paper.
Note that the parameter ! has a structural interpretation: it is a measure of the relative
variability within the old group of the candidatesappeal. As shown above, Y =O (and, hence,
!) a¤ects the number of swing voters in each group. For instance, suppose that O > Y :
Intuitively, this means that the old are more "responsive" in electoral terms to scal policy
announcements in favor of or against them. An alternative interpretation is that 1=J measures
the extent of group J heterogeneity with respect to other policy dimensions that are orthogonal
to scal policy. For example, the young might work in di¤erent sectors and cast their votes also
based on the sectoral policy proposed by each candidate. As a result, the vote of the young
is less responsive to scal policy announcements, and the young have e¤ectively less political
power than the old. This interpretation is consistent with Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999)
3
and Hassler et al. (2005). In the extreme case of ! = 1; the old only care about scal policy
(O ! 0) and the distribution has a mass point at O = 0. In this case, the young have no
inuence and the old dictate their scal policy choice (as in the commitment solution with
 = 0).
Suppose, next, that the groups have di¤erent relative size, and that there are NO old voters
and NY young voters. Proceeding as above, the political objective function is then modied
to
 
b0A; 

A; g

A

=
 
b0B; 

B; g

B

=
= max
b0 ;g

(1  !)NY UY
 
 ; g;G
 
b0

; b; ; R

+ !NOUO (g; b; ; R)
	
We conclude by noting that the probabilistic voting outlined in this appendix applies equally
to both static and dynamic models (under the assumption of MPE). The political model entails
some important restrictions. First, agents only condition their voting strategy on the payo¤-
relevant state variable (here, debt). Second, the shock  is i.i.d. over time otherwise, the
previous realization of  becomes a state variable, complicating the analysis substantially.
Third, although the assumption of uniform distributions can be relaxed, it is necessary to
impose regularity conditions on the density function in order to ensure that the maximization
problem is well behaved.
B2. DERIVATION OF EQUATION (9)
Following the logic of the proof of Proposition 1, write the problem as
max
fb02[b;b];2[0; ]g
U
 
 ; b0  Rb+  w (R) H () ; G  b0; ;R ; ;R
= (1  !)  (1 + ) log (A ( ;R)) +  log  b0  Rb+  w (R) H ()+  log  G  b0; ;R
+!
 
log (A ( 1;R)) +  log
 
b0  Rb+  w (R) H () :
This yields
 (1  !) (1 + )
A ( ;R)
A ( ;R) =

g
(1 + ! (  1)) d
d
(w (R)  H ()) :
Hence, using that fact that A ( ;R) =  w (R) H () and the denition of e () ; we obtain
(1  !) (1 + )
A ( ;R)
= (1  e ()) 
g
(1 + ! (  1)) ;
which is expression (9) in the text.
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B3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Ignoring irrelevant terms, the planning problem can be expressed as
W = max
fgt; t;bt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
 

 
 t+  t+1

gt + (1 + ) 
t+1A ( t;R)

subject to a period budget constraint,
bt+1 = gt +Rbt    tw (R) H ( t) ;
a debt limit (bt  b for all t), and a given b0:
Write the problem as a standard Lagrange problem with multipliers t associated with the
budget constraints. The rst-order conditions for gt ,  t, and bt+1 yield
0 =  t

gt
+  t+1

gt
  t (12)
0 =   t+1 (1 + )
dA( t;R)
d t
A ( t;R)
+ w t

H ( t) +  t
dH ( t)
d t

(13)
0 = t    Rt+1: (14)
Combining (12)-(13) and exploiting that A =  w (R) H () and e () =   (dH=d) (=H ())
yields (11). Combining (12) (for period t and t + 1) and (14) yields g0=g =  R as in the
Proposition. It is clear from this expression that limt!1 gt = 0 since the growth rate of g is
constant and negative (i.e.,  R < 1). In the case of elastic labor supply, the maximum tax
rate is smaller than 100% ( < 1), so the left-hand side of (11) must be bounded away from
zero. Since limt!1 gt = 0, it follows that limt!1 e ( t) = 1 = e () and, hence, limt!1  t =  .
The budget constraint (1) then implies limt!1 bt = b. In the case of inelastic labor supply,
e () = 0 for all  , so limt!1 gt = 0 and (11) imply limt!1  t = 1 and, hence, limt!1 bt = b.
B4. CALIBRATED ECONOMY: THE METHOD OF KRUSELL ET AL. (2002)
In this section, we use the algorithm proposed by Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002, KKS
henceforth) to compute the equilibrium policy functions. As opposed to the global nature of
the projection method, KKS is based on the calculation of higher-order derivatives of (4), (9),
and (7) around the steady state. Using fourth-order derivatives identies the same (internal)
steady state as the one we show in the text, up to the fourth decimal point for debt. As
illustrated in Figure 3 (the analogue of Figure 1), even outside of the steady state the two
solutions are quantitatively similar.
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FIGURE 3 HERE
B5. CRRA UTILITY
In this section, we provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium under general
CRRA utility. We consider the case of inelastic labor supply. The analysis can be extended to
the case of elastic labor supply, though, as in the case of logarithmic utility, a full analytical
solution is not available in this case.
Proposition 3 Assume that agents have CRRA utility:
UY =
c1 Y   1
1   + 
g1    1
1   + 
 
(c0O)
1    1
1   + 
g1    1
1  
!
;
where  > 1=2. Then there exists a SSMPPE equilibrium with policy functions given by
 = T (b; ;R) = 1 

1 +  (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1
  (;R)
w (R)
 
b  b ; (15)
b0 = B (b; ;R) = b 

(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  (;R)
 1
  
b  b ; g = G (b; ;R) =  (;R)  b  b ;
where  (;R) is the unique non-negative solution to the polynomial
(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  (;R)
 1

= R   (;R)
 
1 +

1 + 
1
 (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

!
:
(16)
The world interest rate is pinned down by the unique solution of the following equation:
R = 1 +   (R;!; ; ; ; ) ; (17)
where
  (R;!; ; ; ; )  1 + ! (  1)
(1  !)
 
1 +

1 +  (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

!
:
In the SSMPPE, R = R
 


; namely, the world interest rate is set by the countries with the
strongest preference for the public good. All other countries have R < R () and converge to
immiseration. Finally, the average debt level for countries with  =  is unique and is given by
b
 


= b  (Q)
1
1 


1 

R
(R 1) (R)
  
1  + (R) 
1
1 
R+

(1 !)
(1+!( 1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1

;
where R = R
 


.
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Proof. The optimal savings decision yields
cY =
1
1 + 
1
R
1 

w (R) (1  )
c0O =

1
R
1 

1 + 
1
R
1 

Rw (R) (1  ) :
Thus, ignoring irrelevant terms, we can write the political objective function as
U
 
 ; b0  Rb+ w ;G  b0 ; ;R = 1
1  
h
(1  !)

1 +  (R)
1 


(w (R) (1  ))1 
+ (1 + ! (  1))  b0  Rb+ w (R) 1 
+ (1  !)  G  b0; ;R1 i :
The FOCs yield
(1  !)

1 +  (R)
1 


(w (R) (1  ))  w (R) =  (1 + ! (  1)) g  w (R) ;
 (1 + ! (  1)) g  + (1  !)  g0  @G (b0; ;R)
@b0
= 0:
Rearranging terms yields
w (R) (1  )
g
=

1 +  (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

(18)
g0
g

=   (1  !)
1 + ! (  1)
@G (b0; ;R)
@b0
: (19)
Next, the government budget constraint implies
b  b0 = b  g  Rb  w (1  ) + w:
Plugging in (18), recalling that w = (R  1)b; and rearranging terms yields
b  b0 =  g
 
1 +

1 +  (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

!
+R
 
b  b :
Guess that g =  (;R)
 
b  b.
The GEE implies that
 
b  b0 =  (1  !)
1 + ! (  1)
@G (b0; ;R)
@b0
 1
  
b  b
=

(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  (;R)
 1
  
b  b :
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Hence, we can rewrite the budget constraint as
(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  (;R)
 1
  
b  b
=   (;R)
 
1 +

1 +  (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

! 
b  b+R  b  b :
Hence,  (;R) is the solution to the polynomial equation (16). To see why (16) has a unique
solution such that  > 0, note that the left-hand side of (16) is monotone increasing in  (for
  0), while the right-hand side is monotone decreasing in . Second, for  = 0, the left-hand
side of (16) is zero while the right-hand side is positive.
Moreover, as long as   1 (su¢ cient condition), the solution for  is decreasing in .
To see why, note that the RHS of (16) is in this case increasing in R: Moreover, the LHS is
increasing in  while the RHS is decreasing in : Thus, an increase in R would increase the
RHS of (16), which requires an o¤setting increase in . Then, the generalization of (8) to
CRRA utility yields (15).
Next, we consider the stationary GE solution. In a steady state, b   b0 = b   b implying
that
1 =

(1  !)
1 + ! (  1)  (;R)
 1

)
 (;R) =
1 + ! (  1)
(1  !) :
Substituting this expression of  (;R) into equation (16) yields an implicit expression for the
steady-state level of R (given ),
R = 1 +
1 + ! (  1)
(1  !)
 
1 +

1 + 
1
 (R)
1 

 1  !
 (1 + ! (  1))
 1

!
;
which is equivalent to (17). Consider the above denition of   (R;!; ; ; ; ). Note that
  > 0: If  > 1; then   is decreasing in R: If  2 (1=2; 1) ; then   is increasing and strictly
concave in R: If  2 (0; 1=2) ; then   is increasing and convex in R: Thus,  > 1=2 is a
su¢ cient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a SSMPPE. Moreover,   is decreasing
in : This ensures that (assuming  > 1=2), R () is monotone decreasing in . The proof
that R = R() is the SSMPPE equilibrium interest rate, proceeds as in the case of logarithmic
utility discussed in Section 1. Finally, to compute the steady-state debt in high- economies
(in order to obtain scal policy), note that given the scal policy, savings can be computed as
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a function of b:
s = w (1  )  w (1  )
1 + 
1
R
1 

=
 
1  1
1 + 
1
R
1 

!
(1  !)
(1 + ! (  1)) 
 1
 
1 + 
1
 (R)
1 


g
=

(1  !)
(1 + ! (  1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1 

 
b  b :
Recalling the equilibrium expression for  yields an expression for savings in the high- coun-
tries:
s (T (b; R) ; R) =

(1  !)
(1 + ! (  1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1 

 
b  b :
Imposing that sj = 0 and bj = b (R) = w (R) = (R  1) for all countries with j < , equilibrium
condition 2 can be expressed as
  s (T ; R) = b + (1  )b+K (R; 1) :
Substituting in the savings yields an expression for the average debt in the high- economies: 
1 +

(1  !)
(1 + ! (  1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1 

!

 
b  b = b+K (R; 1) :
Rearranging and substituting in the expressions for K (R; 1) and w (R) yields
b = b  1

 
1 +

(1  !)
(1 + ! (  1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1 

! 1

 
(1  )Q 11  () 1 
(R)

1  (R  1)
+

Q
R
 1
1 
!
= b  (Q)
1
1 


1 

R
(R 1) (R)
  
1  + (R) 
1
1 
R+

(1 !)
(1+!( 1))
 1 
 1




 1

R
1

: (20)
To see that the average steady-state bond holdings b is unique given R = R
 


> 1, note
that the numerator in the second term (on the right-hand side) of equation (20) is monotone
decreasing in R for R > 1, while the denominator is monotone increasing in R.
B6. CALIBRATED ECONOMY: DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
In this section, we consider a fully anticipated demographic transition such that at t = 0 the
economy is in the steady state described in the benchmark calibration of Table 1 with N0 = 1,
where Nt denotes the size of the cohort born at t. Then, at t = 1 there is an unexpected
baby boom, with the size of the young population growing to N1 = 1:35. This corresponds
9
to an annualized population growth rate of 1%. Afterwards, the population growth returns
to zero (baby bust), so the cohort size stays constant at Nt = 1:35 for all t  2. A falling
population growth has two e¤ects in the model. First, by increasing the relative size of the old
cohort, it increases their political inuence (recall that the political weight of the young and
old are, respectively, (1  !)Nt and !Nt 1). This causes a reduction in scal discipline and an
increase in the current taste for the public good (since   1). Second, the fall in population
growth reduces the share of working population and the size of the tax base. Formally, the
government budget constraint must be rewritten as bt+1 (Nt +Nt+1) = (Nt 1 +Nt) = gt +
Rbt   (Nt= (Nt 1 +Nt))  twH ( t), where b and g are now debt and public good per capita,
respectively.
FIGURE 4 HERE
Figure 4 shows the impulse response of debt per capita, public good per capita, and taxes
along the demographic transition. For illustrative purposes, we assume initial debt per capita
to be equal to the nal steady-state debt per capita. Clearly, this choice is arbitrary, but
the main qualitative results do not hinge on it. At t = 1, when the share of young agents
is large, debt falls, as anticipated above. Taxes are low and public good provision is high
due to the large tax base. From t = 2 onward, taxes grow and public good provision falls.
Most interestingly, debt starts growing and eventually converges to the steady state. Thus,
our theory predicts that ageing societies increase debt accumulation, in line with the empirical
observation that since the 1980s an increasing share of old voters has been accompanied by a
rising government debt, especially in quickly ageing societies like Japan.
The U-shaped behavior of debt in the example also resembles the post-war pattern for
debt in the US and most Western European countries. Debt was initially high due to the war
shock (in 1946, the US federal debt-GDP ratio was 122%) and fell gradually until the end of
the 1970s, reaching a trough of 33% in 1981. During this period, the population share over
40 went from 35% in 1948 to 36% in 1981. Thereafter, debt increased reaching 68% in 2008,
while the population share over 40 went up to 46%. In the same period, taxation grew and
the share of government purchase of goods and services fell. Both facts are consistent with the
impulse response of Figure A2.
REFERENCES
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Figure 3 (Appendix B): 
Projection Method vs. Krusell, Kuruscu, and Smith (2002) 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0
0.05
0.1
panel a
debt
ne
xt
-p
er
io
d 
de
bt
 
 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
debt
pu
bl
ic
 s
pe
nd
in
g
panel b
 
 
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
0.3
0.4
0.5
debt
ta
x 
ra
te
panel c
 
 
projection
kks
projection
kks
projection
kks
 
The figure shows policy rules computed using two different numerical methods: the 
projection method (solid line) and the Krusell-Kuruscu-Smith (KKS) method (dotted 
line), respectively. Panels a, b, and c show the equilibrium policy rules for debt B(b), 
public good provision G(b), and taxes T(b), respectively. Parameter values are the 
same as in the calibrated economy (see Table 1). 
Figure 4 (Appendix B): Demographic Transition 
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The figure shows impulse-response functions of a demographic boom-bust shock. The 
annualized population growth increases from zero to 1% in period t=1 and reverts to 
zero thereafter. The initial debt at period 0 is that of steady state. The remaining 
parameter values are listed in Table 1. 
Figure 5 (Appendix B): Government E¢ ciency and Corrup-
tion versus Government Debt
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Figure 5: The upper panel plots the index of corruption perception provided by Transparency
International against the ratio of central government debt to GDP (source: OECD). The
lower panel plots the index of e¤ectiveness of governance from the World Banks Worldwide
Governance Indicators against the ratio of central government debt to GDP (source: OECD).
The observations are averages over 1990-2008 and includes all countries that were OECD
members over the entire period.
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